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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DEBATE:
THE JURY AS SCAPEGOAT
Nancy S. Marder*
I. INTRODUCTION
The civil jury is under attack, particularly as politicians, doctors,
and representatives of the insurance industry urge the need for tort
reform. They focus on high medical malpractice premiums and
doctors who threaten to abandon their practices because they can no
longer afford their premiums.' They wonder how and where women
will find medical care as obstetricians in particular seem to be fleeing
the field, or at least searching for states that have lower medical
2malpractice premiums.
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I want to thank John
Nockleby and the Civil Justice Program at Loyola Law School (L.A.) for
organizing such a wonderful conference and my fellow participants in the
Roundtable discussion "Damage Awards in Personal Injury Litigation," for
helping me to clarify my thoughts on this topic. I also want to thank Michael
Clancy, Bruce Pfaff, and Curt Rodin for sharing with me their litigation
perspectives, experiences, and research and Lucy Moss for providing me with
excellent library assistance.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, With a New Push, Bush Enters Fray Over
Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at Al ("With doctors across the
country protesting the cost of malpractice insurance, President Bush is making
a renewed push for strict limits on the jury awards he blames for skyrocketing
premiums.").
2. See, e.g., Christi Parsons, State Supreme Court,; Malpractice Debate
Pours Cash on Race for Justice, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 2004, at 1, 25 ("Two
southern Illinois hospitals have closed their obstetrical units this year because
of the high cost of insuring staff obstetricians."); Richard W. Stevenson,
President Asks Congress for Measures Against Frivolous Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2003, at A24 (describing President Bush's speech at the University of
Scranton in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in which he said that "the price of
litigiousness was borne by average people like pregnant women who could not
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Amidst these accounts of crisis and calls for immediate change,
the civil jury is often identified as the cu lprit. The charge against
civil juries is that they award excessive damages, particularly in
frivolous lawsuits, and that this, in turn, drives up the cost of medical
malpractice premiums. As a result, doctors and insurers are lobbying
legislators to take quick action and to restrict juries' authority. The
restrictions have often taken the form of imposing caps on non-
economic damages or removing certain types of cases from jury
consideration.
3
Although this account, which I will call the "popular account,"
has spurred many state legislatures to take action, 4 and has even led
Congress to consider the imposition of caps, 5 the popular account
falls woefully short of explaining the nature of the crisis, why the
jury is to blame, and why the quick-fix solutions that wrest power
from the jury are appropriate ones to adopt.
This essay will challenge the popular account beginning with its
assumption that there is a "crisis" for which the jury is responsible.
Much of the press coverage has focused on unusual cases in which
juries have awarded large damages. However, these cases are not
representative of most cases brought in courts every day. As
empirical studies have documented, in many cases plaintiffs who
bring medical malpractice claims do not succeed, and if they do
find obstetricians and poor people whose doctors closed shop."); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Short of Votes, Senate G.O.P. Still Pushes Malpractice Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 1 ("'Women are having trouble finding obstetricians to
be able to deliver their babies,' said Senator John Ensign, Republican of
Nevada....").
3. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales: Right to Trial by Jury
Fades Under Court Rulings, New Laws, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7,
2000, at 1A ("Thirty-four states, including Texas, limit the amount of money
that civil juries can award. Forty-two states have restricted the types of cases
that juries can hear.").
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Carl Hulse, Resigned to Failure,
G.O.P. Still Pushes Forward on Malpractice Cap Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2003, at A 18 ("The House has already passed legislation similar to the bill the
Senate is considering."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Refuses to Consider Cap
On Medical Malpractice Awards, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2003, at A20 ("Voting
mostly along party lines, the Senate refused today to take up a bill that would
cap jury awards in medical malpractice cases . . ").
1268
Spring 2005] THE JURY AS SCAPEGOAT 1269
succeed, the damage awards they receive are quite small.6 The
million-dollar awards might make good reading, but they do not
describe the typical award in a medical malpractice case.
It is not surprising that the press chooses to focus its headlines
on the million-dollar award, but in doing so it fosters the image of
the runaway jury, even when there is no support that juries have gone
awry in their damage awards. Again, several empirical studies show
that jury damage awards are consistent, that judges and juries usually
agree on the damage awards, and that when there are outlying jury
awards, the judge, as part of the process, can reduce the award.7
There are further constraints on the jury that limit any tendencies
toward excess; these include the role of the judge in reviewing the
damage award, the judge's instructions to the jury, and the juror's
oath.
This essay also will challenge the quick-fix solutions that have
been proposed, and in some states adopted, in response to the call for
tort reform. The typical legislative reforms are ones that limit jury
power. 8 These include capping damage awards and taking cases
away from the jury.9 Capping damage awards, for example, while
popular among politicians, is likely to hurt those patients who have
been most severely harmed by medical providers. In addition, such
caps are likely to harm those, such as women, who have non-paying
or low-paying work, and therefore are unable to claim much
economic harm. Under a system of capped damages, they would be
6. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 10, 72.
8. Businesses and service providers, including doctors, also have taken
self-help measures, such as insisting that consumers or patients sign jury
waivers, in which they are asked to give up their right to a jury trial and agree
to binding arbitration. See, e.g., Jane Spencer, Waiving Your Right To a Jury
Trial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2004, at Dl (describing jury waivers, "which
require people to give up the right to have cases heard by their peers," and
which appear in an increasing number of contracts that consumers sign from
buying a car to renting an apartment).
9. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Shrinking Role of Juries, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 23A (describing types of cases, such as
consumer fraud in Illinois and infant injuries at birth in Virginia, that are now
decided by judges rather than juries); Curriden, supra note 3, at 1 A ("Forty-
two states have restricted the types of cases that juries can hear.").
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limited in the amount of damages they could receive for non-
economic injury.
Moreover, none of the reforms are designed to give jurors tools
that they need to perform their role more effectively. Proponents of
tort reform seem intent on limiting the jury's role rather than aiding it
to perform its role more effectively. The tools can be simple-such
as giving juries "guideposts"' 0 for damages that have been awarded
in comparable cases-and yet such approaches are absent from the
debate.
Finally, this essay will explore why the jury is the scapegoat in
the popular account, allowing legislators, doctors, and other
professionals to lose sight of the values that the civil jury offers,
values that Alexis de Tocqueville recognized almost 170 years ago. 11
One reason that the jury is being blamed for spiraling medical
malpractice premiums is that it is an easy target. It consists of
ordinary citizens, who are called to serve in only one case. There are
no professional jurors and there are no repeat players. This is also
one of the values of the jury that Tocqueville and others have
identified. It allows ordinary citizens to bring their commonsense
judgment to bear in hard cases. Just as the Supreme Court justices
recognized that the criminal jury protects defendants against
government overreaching,' 2 the civil jury protects plaintiffs from
individual and corporate wrongdoing. This is an important role, and
one that the popular account would rather overlook, but it is a role
that is vital to our democracy.
This essay is organized in six brief Parts. Part II examines
whether there is a crisis for which the jury is responsible. Part III
highlights some of the quick-fix solutions adopted by legislatures
and the new problems they create. Part IV looks at some of the
institutional safeguards that constrain the jury so that it does not go
10. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments about Liability and
Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 318-22 (1998).
11. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270-76 (J.P.
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (13th ed. 1850).
12. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (describing the
criminal jury as a buffer between the defendant and a "corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and ... the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge").
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awry very often in its award of damages. Part V suggests additional
tools that courts could give jurors to improve the jury's performance.
Finally, Part VI considers why the jury has become a convenient
scapegoat and the dangers the popular account and its quick-fix
solutions pose to the jury.
II. Is THERE A CRISIS FOR WHICH THE JURY IS RESPONSIBLE?
A. Is There a Crisis?
Throughout the country, doctors have pointed out that their
medical malpractice premiums are increasing to the point where
some have decided to leave the profession. 13 In some states, such as
New Jersey, they have even staged protests or work stoppages to
draw attention to their plight. 14  Some doctors explain that it no
longer makes economic sense for them to remain in practice when
more and more of their income is going toward payment of their
premiums. 15 Other doctors have decided to relocate to states where
13. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Senate Bill To Cap Jury Awards
Stalls; Medical Malpractice a Partisan Fight, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2003, at 12
("Physicians are moving to states with favorable laws and insurance premiums,
or leaving medicine altogether.").
14. See Andrew Jacobs, Anatomy of a Strike: Doctors 'E-Mail Shows Depth
of Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at B 1; Richard Lezin Jones, Job Action
by Doctors Winds Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at BI ("Leaders [of the
New Jersey doctors' work slowdown] said they had no plans to call for an
official end to the protest, the largest of a series of recent strikes and
slowdowns around the country by doctors angry over soaring malpractice
insurance rates."); Richard Lezin Jones & Robert Hanley, Trenton Seeks a
Compromise for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at B5 ("The [New Jersey]
job action, which organizers estimate involves 70 percent of the state's 22,000
doctors, is by far the largest of several that have occurred across the country in
the last year."); see also Jane Gordon, Doctors Plan Rally Over Malpractice
Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Conn.), Feb. 16, 2003, § 14, at 5 (describing a doctors' rally
at the State Capitol in Hartford, Connecticut); Joseph B. Treaster, Surgeons
Explain Reasons for Their Walkout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at A7
(describing surgeons' work stoppage in West Virginia).
15. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 5 ("'I simply cannot afford to stay
in practice and not make a living...."') (quoting Dr. Jacobs, a solo
practitioner in Hartford, Connecticut); Robert Hanley, Lawyers Respond to
Threat of Doctors' Job Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at B5 ("'I have a
friend retiring at age 57 because his insurance rate has quadrupled and he can't
afford to run his office and stay in practice .... "') (quoting Dr. Robert S.
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their premiums are less than what they currently pay. 16  When
doctors leave states in search of lower premiums, they may leave
locales, particularly in rural areas, without doctors in that specialty. 17
The American Medical Association has described the situation of
doctors in nineteen states as having reached "a crisis."'1 8
The doctors' economic difficulties-of having to contend with
ever-increasing medical malpractice premiums-have been
described not only by doctors, but also by those in the press and the
legislature, as a "medical malpractice crisis." Although some
doctors' economic difficulties are real, it is unclear that they have
reached the level of a "crisis." According to one report, while
premiums have been going up, so have doctors' salaries. 19  Yet,
Democrats and Republicans alike in Congress have resorted to the
language of fear and crisis. 20  Newspaper headlines reinforce the
view that the doctors' situation has indeed reached "crisis"
Rigolosi, a kidney specialist).
16. See, e.g., Treaster, supra note 14, at A7 ("In the last year, more than
100 West Virginia doctors have moved to other states where insurance rates
are considered more tolerable."). But see Christi Parsons & Bruce Japsen,
Physician Count Clouds Malpractice Argument, State Data Show Increase in
Doctors, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 2004, § 3, at 1 ("[Illinois] figures indicate that
there has been a steady increase in the number of doctors licensed by the state
in recent years-even in high-risk specialty fields in which doctors reportedly
were leaving Illinois in search of lower insurance premiums.").
17. See, e.g., Brad Cole, Commentary, When Doctors Start Leaving Town,
CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2004, at 19 ("[I]n southern Illinois... the area's only two
neurosurgeons (based in the region's medical hub, Carbondale) decided to
close their practices and relocate out of state to find more favorable
malpractice insurance rates. This left the citizens of the lower third of Illinois
without a neurosurgeon.").
18. Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 13, at 12.
19. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Doctors Turn to Patients for Insurance
Help; Malpractice Surcharges on the Rise, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2004, at 10
("[F]rom 1999 through 2003, the average reportable compensation of primary
care physicians rose nearly 9 percent, to $156,902. Specialists fared better;
their incomes rose more than 20 percent in the last four years to $296,000 from
an average of nearly $246,000.").
20. Republican Senator Bill Frist has described the medical malpractice
issue as "'a national emergency that is hurting people .... It's a crisis that is
increasing." Stolberg, supra note 5, at A20 (quoting Senator Frist). According
to another article, even "Democrats concede that there is a medical liability
crisis." Stolberg & Hulse, supra note 5, at A18.
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proportions.
2 1
It is not surprising that journalists, in their coverage of the
escalating costs of medical malpractice premiums, have embraced
the language of "crisis." By describing the doctors' premiums as a
crisis, journalists help to create a dramatic story, and in doing so,
they attract readers to their articles. If the story were simply that
doctors' premiums are going up, just like everyone else's premiums,
whether for auto insurance or homeowner's insurance, there would
not be much of a story there. But if the premiums can be described
as creating a crisis, then it is worthy of front-page coverage. Not
surprisingly, then, "[c]overage in the news media has highlighted
incidents like a walkout by surgeons in West Virginia, who stopped
seeing patients in January [2003] to protest the cost of medical
malpractice insurance in their state."
22
Legislators' use of the term "crisis" to describe the increase in
doctors' medical malpractice premiums allows them to resort to
quick-fix solutions without taking much time for careful study or
well thought out proposals. If there is a "crisis," then the legislators
must act quickly. In the face of such urgency, they propose measures
that are easy to implement even though it is unclear that these
measures will alleviate the so-called crisis.23  If the increase in
premiums had been described as "cyclical" rather than as a "crisis,"
then legislators might have looked for long-term solutions, rather
than stop-gap measures.
I do not mean to suggest that some doctors' economic plight is
not serious. I simply want to call attention to the way in which it has
been described. By labeling it a crisis, which requires immediate
attention, further study is foreclosed, and this is to the detriment of
the jury.
21. See, e.g., Editorial, A Southern Illinois Revolt, CHI. TRIB., July 13,
2004, at 18; Susan Kuczka, Doctors Highlight Illinois Exodus: Wristbands
Send Message on Costs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2005, §2, at 1; see also Stephen
Labaton, Added Rush On Revising Tort System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at
C I (describing the added urgency of tort reform after September 11, 2001).
22. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Transplant Mix-Up Enters Debate on Malpractice
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at A18.
23. See infra Part III (describing the quick-fix solutions that state
legislatures have adopted).
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B. Is the Jury Responsible for the "Crisis "?
In press reports and political debates on the "medical
malpractice crisis," the civil jury has been singled out as the leading
culprit.24 The jury has been held responsible for the current crisis in
at least two ways. First, there is the view that plaintiffs file
"frivolous" lawsuits for which the jury finds the defendant liable and
awards damages.25 President Bush has described the problem as
"'junk lawsuits' .. . driving 'good docs' from practice." 6 Second,
there is the belief that when the jury awards damages, it awards
excessive damages. The Bush Administration, the American
Medical Association, and other medical groups "advocate capping
the amount of money patients harmed by medical negligence could
collect from doctors and hospitals."
27
The press, in its reporting of jury verdicts, focuses on those
cases in which the awards were in the millions of dollars. 28 Thus,
according to this account, which I have labeled the "popular
account," the civil jury is responsible for the escalating medical
malpractice premiums because it fails to discern between frivolous
suits and meritorious ones and because it awards excessive damages.
According to insurers, these irresponsible acts by juries are
unpredictable and have left them with no choice but to increase
medical malpractice premiums.
29
24. See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, The Best Course of Treatment, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2003, at A19 (singling out the jury for blame in the medical
malpractice crisis and urging that "[e]xpert judges, not juries, must decide what
is a valid claim").
25. See Stolberg, supra note 5, at A20 ("Republicans, and the doctors,
insurers and corporate interests who tend to support them, say the caps are
necessary to stem a rising tide of frivolous lawsuits that are driving up
malpractice premiums.").
26. Boodman, supra note 19, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with
the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort
Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419, 423-26 (1996).
29. Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or Easy Answers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at Cl ("The insurance companies say the limits on
awards for pain and suffering eliminate an emotional wild card in dealing with
claims.").
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The popular account should not be accepted at face value. There
are several ways in which this account lacks explanatory power. To
begin with, there are very few civil jury trials each year in the United
States. Most lawsuits are resolved by motion, settlement, or
alternative dispute resolution. In the year 2000, for example, only
3% of all civil cases in federal courts went to trial, and the number
that went to trial before a jury was even smaller.3 ° In the year 2001,
only about 2% of all civil cases in federal courts went to trial. 3' For
the same year, state courts of general jurisdiction in seventy-five of
the largest counties held almost 12,000 tort, contract, and real
property civil trials, of which three-fourths were decided by juries
and one-fourth were decided by judges.32 The 12,000 civil trials in
these state courts represent a 47% decline from the number of civil
trials in 1992.33 For the year 2001, only about 3% of civil cases in
state courts were decided by a jury or bench trial.34 Although I have
argued elsewhere that the small number of jury trials does not detract
from the important role that juries play in our society,35 it seems
unlikely that the small number of jury trials is enough to explain the
increase in medical malpractice premiums. Moreover, as medical
malpractice premiums have increased in recent years, the number of
jury trials in both state and federal courts has continued to decrease.
The dwindling number of trials has not escaped notice; recent articles
and conferences have taken up the theme of the "vanishing trial. 36
The number of jury trials in medical malpractice cases in
particular has continued to decline in a number of jurisdictions. For
example, from January through August, 2004, the number of medical
malpractice cases filed in Cook County, Illinois declined by 24%.37
30. OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 9, 19, 22 (2003).
31. Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in
Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Apr. 2004, at 7.
32. Id. at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1-2.
35. See Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to The Jury at a Crossroad: The
American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 924 (2003).
36. See generally Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 459 (2004).
37. Sarah A. Klein, Cook County Malpractice Suits Drop; Theories Vary as
Spring 2005] 1275
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1267
Illinois is one state that has been in the throes of the medical
malpractice debate. In Illinois, doctors' complaints about the high
cost of premiums led some cities to take action on their own, such as
imposing caps. 38 The medical malpractice debate in Illinois also
triggered a fierce campaign for a seat on the Illinois Supreme
Court,39 which has twice held that damage caps are unconstitutional.
According to the popular account, plaintiffs file lawsuits in
medical malpractice cases and win big; however, empirical studies
show otherwise. According to one study which analyzed data from
Franklin County, Ohio, plaintiffs' win rates in medical malpractice
and product liability cases tended to be low, and when they did win
their damage awards were modest.40 According to one legal
reporter: "In general, medical malpractice verdicts tend to favor the
defendants more so than in other types of cases., 41 For example,
statistics for medical malpractice cases in Cook County, Illinois
during the year ending September 2003, as reported in the Jury
Verdict Reporter, show that defendants in medical malpractice cases
won 58.7% of the time.42 In an earlier comprehensive study, the
National Center for State Courts found that plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases won 30% of the time, whereas plaintiffs in all jury
trials won 51% of the time.
43
Press coverage contributes to the public perception that plaintiffs
win big when they file medical malpractice and other torts cases. In
one study of newsmagazine coverage of tort litigation, the
researchers found that medical malpractice and product liability
cases received a disproportionate amount of coverage given the
'04 Cases Fall, CRAN'S CHI. Bus., Sept. 20, 2004, at 1.
38. See Cole, supra note 17, at 19 (explaining why the city of Carbondale
enacted caps on non-economic damages).
39. See infra note 54.
40. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in
Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999).
41. Jaime Levy, Settlement Survey: Birth-Trauma Cases Yield Year's
Largest Awards, CHI. LAW., Oct. 2004, at 8, 10.
42. Id.
43. Charley Roberts, Are Runaway Jury Awards a Real Issue?, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 8, 1995, at 1, 9 (citing the National Center for State Courts' study of
tort and contract litigation in forty-five of the nation's seventy-five largest
urban areas, including nine in California).
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number of actual cases and contributed to a skewed perception of the
rates at which plaintiffs in tort cases prevailed at trial and the mean
and median damages awarded. 4  Another study, which looked at
personal injury awards reported in two major New York newspapers
between 1988 and 1993, found that the typical reported award was
more than $5 million, while the typical award for this period was
$213,000 in New York State and $252,000 in the New York
metropolitan area.45 However, one researcher who conducted a
national telephone survey to ascertain public perceptions of civil jury
awards concluded that while the public had an inflated view of jury
damage awards, it was "not as great as one might expect given the
newspaper reports."
46
III. WHY THE POPULAR, "QUICK-FIX" SOLUTIONS
SHOULD BE RESISTED
In response to the popular account of the "medical malpractice
crisis," state legislatures have typically adopted one or two "quick-
fix" solutions. One response has been to cap the damages that juries
can award for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases.
A second response has been to take certain types of cases away from
the jury altogether. Neither approach is likely to stop the increase in
medical malpractice premiums and both are likely to do long-term
harm to the jury.
A. Capping Non-Economic Damage Awards
Many states have responded to the increase in medical
malpractice premiums by capping damage awards for non-economic
injuries in medical malpractice cases.47 This has meant that if a jury
44. See Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 28, at 423-26.
45. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards,
23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 772-73 (1995).
46. Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Perceptions of Civil Jury Verdicts, 85
JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2001).
47. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A
Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July/Aug.
2004, at 54 ("Twenty-one states already cap damages for noneconomic losses
in medical malpractice cases, generally with ceilings in the range of $250,000-
$750,000.").
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awards damages for non-economic injuries that exceed the cap, the
judge must reduce the award to the statutory maximum. A typical
cap for non-economic injuries ranges from $250,000 to $750,000.48
California, for example, has a cap of $250,000 for non-economic
damages. 49 This amount has remained the same since it was first put
into effect in 1975.50 In 2003, when Congress considered legislation
providing for caps for non-economic damages, the dollar figure it
used was $250,000. 51  The cap typically applies only to non-
economic injury, such as pain and suffering, and not to economic
injury, such as loss of one's job and therefore of one's income.12 Six
states, however, cap total damages.
53
The idea behind the cap is that economic harm can be readily
determined, whereas pain and suffering are more subjective and
difficult to calculate. The vagueness of "pain and suffering" has
meant that juries could use it to award substantial damages,
particularly if the person who had been severely harmed did not earn
much income and therefore would not have significant economic
injury for which to claim economic damages.
One problem with capping non-economic damages is that those
who are most severely harmed by medical negligence are those
whose financial recovery will now be limited by the cap. Consider,
for example, the infant born with cerebral palsy because the
attending anesthesiologist was in another room in the hospital with a
nurse with whom he was having a relationship, and did not respond
to two beeper calls for 40 to 50 minutes. 54 This infant would only be
48. Id.
49. Elizabeth Austin & Jim Day, Rising Awards Add Fuel to Debate on
Tort Reform, CHI. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 24, 76.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 22, at A18 ("President Bush is seeking to
overhaul the nation's medical liability system, including legislation that would
impose, among other things, a $250,000 cap on jury awards for noneconomic
or 'pain and suffering' damages.").
52. Studdert et al., supra note 47, at 54.
53. Id.
54. See Levy, supra note 41, at 9. This case occurred in Illinois, where
there are no statutory caps for non-economic damages yet, but where the issue
has sparked intense debate and campaigning because the Illinois Supreme
Court has, in the past, struck down such a cap as unconstitutional. See
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able to recover up to $250,000 for pain and suffering in a state with
such a statutory cap for non-economic damages. Although one
common justification for such a cap is that there are too many
frivolous lawsuits, in fact, caps only affect the meritorious
lawsuits-the ones in which the defendant has been found to be
liable and the plaintiff has been severely injured and awarded
substantial damages for non-economic injuries.
Another problem with capping non-economic damages is that it
is probably most likely to harm those who earn modest or no
incomes, such as women, minorities, children, the elderly, and the
disabled. For example, a man who has a high income can show
economic harm if, through medical negligence, he suffers brain
damage and is no longer able to work. An elderly woman or a stay-
at-home mom who receives that same injury through medical
negligence, however, cannot show such economic harm if she has no
income. Juries can compensate for this disparity by providing for
damages based on the victim's pain and suffering. Under a cap
regime, however, that amount will be severely curtailed. The man
with the high income can still receive damages for his economic loss,
but the elderly woman or stay-at-home mom can only receive the
statutory cap for pain and suffering.
A statutory cap is a blunt instrument with which to stave off
rising medical malpractice premiums. It harms those who have been
most severely injured by medical negligence and limits them to a cap
that is modest in light of the devastating injuries they have suffered.
It may well harm those who are among society's most vulnerable
because they have limited economic resources to cope with severe
medical injuries caused by medical negligence and will have even
Parsons, supra note 2, at I ("Hoping to influence how courts deal with the
controversial issue of medical malpractice, heavyweight special interest groups
are pouring so much money into the race for the southern Illinois seat on the
state Supreme Court that it has become the most expensive in Illinois court
history."); Christi Parsons, Doctor Shortage Cited in GOP Win, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 12 ("In this race [for Illinois Supreme Court justice],
insurance companies and other business interests from around the nation
helped to funnel more than $8 million into the district, setting a national record
for a court race and fueling a firestorm of TV ads.").
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fewer resources as a result of capped damage awards for pain and
suffering.
A statutory cap also has a harsh effect on the survivors of a
person who has died through medical negligence; they are less likely
to be able to see that justice is done. A cap of $250,000, such as in
California, deters lawyers from taking medical malpractice cases
unless they involve future medical costs or economic costs. Cases
resulting in death do not involve such costs. In cases where the
negligence leads to the death of a non-wage earner, such as an infant,
disabled person, or stay-at-home mom, survivors can receive at most
$250,000 for pain and suffering. Few lawyers can afford to take
these cases, which are typically brought on a contingency fee basis.
Because a typical case costs about $100,000 to go to trial and the
insurer has little incentive to settle, little recompense remains for the
survivors or lawyer.5 5  Thus, the statutory cap means that those
whose loss is most severe (in that their loved one has died through
medical negligence) are the least likely to have access to justice.
Perhaps most significant, even representatives of the insurance
industry have acknowledged that caps will not necessarily lead to a
decrease in the medical malpractice premiums. 56 This suggests that
other factors are at work in the rising cost of premiums, such as the
cyclical nature of the insurance industry,5 7 underperforming
investments that insurers have made,5 8 and the inability of the
55. See, e.g., Treaster, supra note 29, at Cl.
56. See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 1, at Al ("Even representatives of the
insurance industry blame factors in addition to jury verdicts.").
57. Bob Herbert, Cooking Up a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A25
(citing the Congressional Budget Office's explanations for the rising cost of
malpractice premiums, including the "cyclical factors in the insurance
market"); Oppel, supra note 1, at Al (describing insurance industry practices
in which insurers increased premiums in the 1980s to offset future claims, but
when these did not occur at the level anticipated, the reserves were treated as
profits, encouraging new insurers into the market and leading to a price war).
58. See, e.g., Amy L. Faust, Letter to the Editor, Health Care and Job
Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2004, at A26 ("Workers and businesses are
paying for insurance companies' huge investment losses during the recession,
and are still lining their executives' pockets now that the business climate has
improved."); Oppel, supra note 1, at Al (describing medical malpractice
insurers who are able to invest premiums for much longer than other insurers
before their claims come due and who suffered because of steep drops in the
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medical profession to weed out bad doctors.
59
B. Taking Cases Away From Juries
Another legislative response to the medical malpractice crisis
has been to take certain cases away from juries even though juries
have traditionally decided such cases. According to one report, as of
the year 2000, forty-two states had restricted the types of cases that
juries could hear.
60
This response has entailed taking certain types of cases away
from juries and giving them to others to decide. For example, cases
of consumer fraud in Illinois, infant injuries at birth in Virginia, and
negative vaccine reactions in North Carolina are decided now by
judges rather than juries.6 1 In Texas, a special state commission
decides worker's compensation cases, whereas juries had previously
heard such cases. 62  A federal law bans lawsuits based on small
airplane crashes if the airplanes are eighteen years old or older,
regardless of the cause of the crash, including assembly errors or
defective parts.
63
Another method of undercutting the right to jury trial has been
for states to expand the list of those actors who are immune from
suit. For example, volunteer firefighters in Hawaii, Montana, and
West Virginia, prescription drug makers in Utah, and officers of
nonprofit organizations in seventeen states can no longer be sued in
bond yields and the stock market after the 1990s); Stolberg, supra note 2, at 1
("Democrats, and the trial lawyers and consumer groups who support them...
tend to blame the insurance industry for the malpractice crisis, saying that the
industry has increased rates to compensate for investment losses in the stock
market.").
59. See, e.g., Edward Lloyd, Letter to the Editor, Insurance Costs, CHI.
TRIB., July 16, 2004, at 28 ("The medical profession, including state medical
boards, continues to ignore the few doctors causing all the problems.").
60. Curriden, supra note 3, at IA.
61. Curriden, supra note 9, at 23A.
62. Id.
63. Mark Curriden, Statutes Can Shield Companies; Sometimes Merit Can
Be Irrelevant, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 25A. One woman,
whose husband died when his small, twenty-year old plane crashed, in part due
to a defect in the plane, discovered that she could not sue the manufacturer.
She was surprised by this discovery: "'I thought I had rights to take this to a
jury, and then I found I didn't have those rights."' Id. (quoting Janell Warner).
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their states' courts.6 4  In Texas in 1995, the legislature shielded
accountants, real estate agents, lawyers, doctors, and engineers from
allegations of deceptive trade practices, 65 while Louisiana protected
doctors and lawyers from malpractice claims after three years.
66
Citizens who have been harmed by these actors' conduct can no
longer seek redress through a jury trial in state court.
The reduction in the types of cases that juries can hear lessens
the protection that juries afford to all citizens. These types of cases
are precisely the ones that call for community values. The jury,
which has been valued because it expresses the commonsense
judgment of the community, is now being removed from the
decision-making process. Moreover, this process is failing to attract
much notice. Although capped damage awards captured most of the
newspaper headlines, perhaps because even Congress considered
imposing such caps, 6 7 taking cases away from the jury undermines
the protection of the ordinary citizen. As one mother whose daughter
was killed while crossing the street after leaving the school bus, and
who cannot sue the school system because it is immune from suit in
Texas, remarked: "'When did juries go away?'
6 8
IV. THE JURY'S INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Although proponents of the popular account assume that
excessive jury damage awards are the prime reason for escalating
medical malpractice premiums, and urge quick-fix solutions, such as
capping non-economic damage awards or taking certain types of
cases away from the jury, there are several institutional safeguards
that already constrain jury damage awards. If proponents of the
popular account paid greater heed to these institutional safeguards,
then they would feel less need to impose quick-fix solutions that do
more harm than good. These safeguards include the judge's review
of the jury's damage award, the judge's instructions to the jury, and
the juror's oath.
64. Curriden, supra note 9, at 23A.
65. Curriden, supra note 63, at 25A.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
68. Curriden, supra note 3, at 1A (quoting Maria Gutierrez).
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A. Judicial Review of Damage Awards
After the jury determines damages, either party can seek review
of the award by the trial judge. Through remittitur69 or additur,7 ° the
judge can either decrease or increase the damage award. Review of
the damage award by the trial judge is an integral part of the process.
If the judge decreases or increases the jury's damage award in the
post-verdict period, this does not necessarily mean that the jury was
wrong in its determination; it can simply mean that the judge had
information that the jury did not have. For example, juries are not
typically told if there is a statutory cap that limits the amount of
damages that can be awarded for non-economic injury.71 The judge
would have to adjust the jury's award downward if it exceeded the
cap.
Thus, the determination of damages in a jury trial needs to be
viewed as a two-step process involving two decision-makers. First,
the jury determines the damages. Second, the trial judge reviews that
determination. The authors of one empirical study have noted that
the judge's adjustment of the damage award in the post-verdict phase
often goes unrecognized,72 even though the adjustment can be
significant. For example, this empirical study, which analyzed data
from several state verdict reporters, including data for medical
malpractice cases in New York between 1985-1997, found that New
York judges adjusted damage awards, usually downward, in 44% of
the cases.
73
69. Remittitur, "[tihe power to reduce damages[,J... is recognized by
virtually all judicial systems." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL'
PROCEDURE § 12.4, at 560 (2d ed. 1993).
70. Additur, which is "the power to increase damages[,] ... has not been
accepted in all courts." Id. However, some state courts have upheld its
constitutionality under state law. See id. at 561.
71. One explanation for this practice is that otherwise juries would add
extra money for medical costs or lost wages. See Edward Felsenthal, Why a
Medical Award Cap Remains Stuck at $250,000, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995,
at B 1.
72. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-
Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 298-99
(1998).
73. Id. at 298. During the same time period, and using verdict reporters in
Florida and California, Vidmar found that the reductions in jury awards in
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One question is how to make the public, press, and politicians
aware of the interim nature of the jury's damage award and the
integral role that the judge plays in the determination of the actual
damage award. In an earlier piece, I explored several options,
including delaying the announcement of the damage award until after
the judge's review, having the judge describe the jury's award as an
"interim" award, and having the judge become involved in the award
determination at an earlier stage.74 Another option, though not one
that I favor, is having the judge make the damage award on his or her
own.
75
The advantage of any of the first three options is that they
preserve the joint role of jury and judge in the award of damages.
One reason that judges should not decide damages alone is that these
are decisions for which there is no right answer and so we turn to a
jury to obtain a community sense of what is appropriate. By having
the jury reach a determination first, the damage award will have the
input of the community. By having the judge review the
determination, the award will be consistent with awards in
comparable cases. The challenge is to explain to those outside the
courtroom that there is a two-step process and that juries and judges
are reaching the determination together. Thus, the jury award has
not been reached by a runaway jury, but rather by a jury whose work
has been reviewed by a judge.
Unfortunately, press coverage of jury damage awards merely
exacerbates the problem. The press focuses on news, not ordinary,
everyday events. 76 Thus, if most jury awards are modest,77 and if
these two states were less dramatic than in New York, but the awards,
especially in Florida, were substantially smaller than those in New York. Id. at
292, 295,298.
74. See Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Damages: A Commentary, 48
DEPAUL L. REv. 427, 437-42 (1998).
75. See id. at 439, 441-42.
76. Floyd Norris, a columnist for The New York Times and one of the
participants at the conference at Loyola Law School, made this point clear in
some of his comments during the question and answer period of the
Roundtable. See Panel IV-Roundtable: Damage Awards in Personal Injury
Litigation, Loyola Law School (Oct. 1, 2004) (tape on file with Professor
Nockleby, Loyola Law School).
77. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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those that are not modest are typically reduced by the judge,78 then
these humdrum events are unlikely to receive attention by the press.
Rather, press coverage will necessarily focus on the few large
awards, the ones that will make the news because they are
extraordinary, if not sensational. Unfortunately, such coverage,
though reasonable from the press's perspective, contributes to a
common misperception that most jury damage awards are excessive.
Occasionally, there are articles reporting on jury trends, 79 but these
few articles are unable to counter the image of the runaway jury
created by articles focusing on the high, but aberrational, damage
awards.
After the trial judge has reviewed the jury's damage award, an
appellate panel of judges can review the award as well. For example,
if the defendant is found liable and the plaintiff is awarded damages,
the defendant can appeal both the liability finding and the damage
award. Thus, the jury's damage award is subject to scrutiny by at
least two levels of courts, with the possibility of a third should the
state's highest court agree to review the case as well. Appellate
review, however, is unlikely to change popular perceptions about
runaway jury awards because by the time the appellate court decides
the case, it has long since disappeared from public attention.
B. Jury Instructions
Another institutional feature that can constrain jury damage
awards is the judge's instructions to the jury. The judge has
responsibility for informing jurors about their roles in the judicial
process, including how they are to determine damages.
In spite of the criticisms of jury instructions, such as that they
are lengthy, difficult to follow, and directed to a legal rather than a
lay audience,80 they remain the primary means by which jurors learn
78. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Juries, Their Powers Under Siege, Find
Their Role Is Being Eroded, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at Al; William
Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9.
80. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with
Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1101, 1101-02, 1105-12, 1117-18 (1993); Robert P.
Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
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what they are supposed to do as jurors. For example, the judge
explains to the jurors that they are the finders of fact and that they are
to apply the law as the judge gives it to them to the facts as they find
them.81 The judge also explains to the jurors that in their fact-finding
role, they are to decide which witnesses they find credible and which
version of the facts they believe.
82
Jurors typically take their cues from the judge.83 Even when the
judge tries to maintain a neutral demeanor and not reveal his
personal predilections, jurors often discern his views based on more
subtle means such as his body language and intonation.84 After all,
the judge is an authority figure in the courtroom and the jurors are,
for the most part, new to their job. When the judge speaks directly to
the jury through jury instructions, typically delivered at the end of
the trial before the jury commences its deliberations, 85 the jurors
attend carefully to his words. Thus, they try to follow the judge's
instructions about how they are to perform their job in general and
how they are to determine damages in particular.
Almost 170 years ago, Tocqueville presciently noted the
authority that the judge exerts over jurors, particularly in civil
cases. 86 He explained.that jurors were likely to look to the judge in
civil cases, more so than in criminal cases, because civil cases tended
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979);
Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
BYU L. REV. 601, 601-06, 616-23.
81. See, e.g., 4 HON. LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) (2004) 71.2 ("My duty at this point is to instruct you
as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them
to the facts as you determine them.. ").
82. See, e.g., id. 1.8 (Credibility of Witnesses).
83. See Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to
Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1278 (1975).
84. Id.
85. There has been a move to introduce preliminary jury instructions early
in the trial and then give final instructions at the end of the trial, but this
approach has been tried by judges in just a few states, such as Arizona. See
ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS:
THE POWER OF 12 (1994) [hereinafter POWER OF 12]; B. Michael Dann &
George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280,
280-83 (1996).
86. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 274.
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to be more complicated than criminal cases and because in criminal
cases the judge appeared to be another governmental actor from
which the jury needed to protect the defendant, whereas in civil
cases, the jury had no similar concern. 87 Tocqueville urged judges to
see the influence that they could have over jurors in civil cases and to
realize that jurors would take what they learned from the judge about
judicious thinking in the courtroom and apply it to their own
business conduct when they returned to their private lives.
88
Judges can use the instructions to give guidance to jurors about
determining damage awards. In their instructions, judges can
highlight the factors that jurors should consider, as well as those they
should ignore. For example, in some states jurors are not to consider
whether the plaintiff has insurance.89 Rather, they are to reach a
damage award without any consideration of third-party coverage,
and the judge so instructs the jury. Thus, when the popular account
describes jury damage awards as having gone awry, this ignores the
effect that jury instructions have on jurors' efforts to perform their
job ably, including their efforts to determine appropriate damage
awards. The problem with damage award instructions is that they
tend to be vague. If they were used to provide jurors with additional
information about determining damages, 90 then jurors would try to
follow these instructions, just as they try to follow all of the
instructions that the judge gives them.
C. Juror's Oath
Another constraining factor on jurors' performance of their role
in determining damage awards is the oath that they take before they
serve on the petit jury. After the jurors have been selected, but
before the trial has commenced, the jury is impaneled. The jurors,
having been seated in the jury box, are asked to rise as a body and to
87. Id.
88. Id. at 275.
89. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI)
§ 1.04 (8th ed. 1995) ("There is no evidence before you that the defendant has
or does not have insurance for the plaintiffs claim. Whether such insurance
exists has no bearing upon any issue in this case. You must not discuss or
consider it for any purpose.").
90. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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take an oath in which they swear to uphold the law. A typical oath in
a civil case is as follows:
Do you, and each of you, understand and agree that you will
well and truly try the cause now pending before this court,
and a true verdict render according only to the evidence
presented to you and to the instructions of the court? 91
The jurors take the oath together and in the presence of the judge, the
public, the parties, and God. The oath is designed to impress upon
the jurors the seriousness of their task.
92
The jurors are asked to decide the case in accordance with the
evidence presented at trial and the instructions provided by the judge.
Thus, the jurors know from the outset that they must follow the law
as the judge has explained it to them. The jurors are not free to
decide the case any way they think. 93 Rather, there are constraints,
such as the evidence and the instructions, which they have agreed to
follow before all present in the courtroom. Similarly, in deciding the
damage award the jurors are constrained by the evidence that has
been presented at trial and the instructions given by the judge. The
jurors have agreed to abide by these conditions in the public setting
of the courtroom and in the presence of witnesses. Even if they end
up sympathizing with the injured plaintiff, they are to be governed by
what the evidence shows and the instructions provide.
91. California Courts: Guide to California Jury Service: The Trial Process,
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/stepl.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
92. See WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 356 (2d ed. 1875)
(observing that jurors must "promise, under the awful sanction of an oath, to
lay aside anger, and hate, and fear; nor allow themselves to be swayed by love
or friendship while they address themselves to their solemn duties").
93. The juror, like the judge, "is not a knight-errant roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). Jurors, like judges, fill in
the gaps left by the law and instructions by drawing from their own experience;
however, they are not free to ignore the law and instructions. This is so
particularly in civil cases, where judges have procedural devices, such as
special verdicts, see FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a), or general verdicts accompanied by
interrogatories, see FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b), to help the jury structure its
deliberations. These devices are available to judges in civil, but not in
criminal, cases.
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V. GIVING JURORS TOOLS To IMPROVE
THEIR PERFORMANCE
In spite of the institutional safeguards that constrain a jury when
it determines damages, the jury, like any institution, has room for
improvement. The jury could determine damages more efficaciously
if it had certain tools. These tools would aid it in the performance of
this role, rather than deprive it of this role altogether, as proponents
of the popular account would do. A judge could provide the
following tools: guidelines from past comparable cases; a special
verdict or interrogatories to guide the jury in its determination; and
basic instruments such as a laptop with an Excel spreadsheet or at
least a calculator.
A. Guidelines
Two empirical studies that looked at jury damage awards, one in
medical malpractice cases 94 and another in product liability cases,
95
found the awards to be fairly consistent,96 but suggested ways in
which they could be made even more consistent. One way was for
judges to provide jurors with guidelines, or "guideposts" 97 to use
Shari Diamond's term, or "schedules" 98 to use Peter Schuck's term,
from past comparable cases.
The guidelines could take several different forms. One
possibility is for courts to give juries a distribution of awards in
comparable cases. One difficulty, of course, is deciding which cases
are comparable. As Shari Diamond has pointed out, 99 however, this
94. See Vidmar et al., supra note 72, at 265.
95. See Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 315-16.
96. See Vidmar et al., supra note 72, at 267, 281, 295 (finding that juries in
their award of damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice cases in
Califomia, New York, and Florida reached consistent awards which were not
as high as press accounts suggested because they were often reduced by trial
judges in the post-verdict period); Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 315-16
(finding greater variability for damage awards than for liability, but finding
less variability for juries' damage awards than for individual jurors' damage
awards).
97. Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 318.
98. Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 325-26 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
99. See Diamond et al., supra note 10, at 320.
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is the same problem that the drafters of the United States Sentencing
GuidelinesO° faced when they tried to determine an appropriate
range of sentences for particular crimes and drew on past practices in
different jurisdictions. The drafters of a "Guideline for Jury Damage
Awards" would have to take care to avoid the pitfall of the
Sentencing Guidelines, which is that they are not truly "guidelines,"
but rather, a rigid grid from which departures, either upward or
downward, are extremely difficult for judges to make. The
Sentencing Guidelines managed to shift sentencing discretion from
judges to prosecutors. 1 1  A guideline for damages, unlike the
Sentencing Guidelines for judges, would have to give juries guidance
without depriving them of their discretion. Even with this caveat,
however, there still would be some loss of autonomy for the jury and
some assertion of authority by whoever drafts the guidelines.1
0 2
There are several other ways that judges could give guidance to
juries without being overly intrusive. One possibility is for the court
to provide jurors with a list of factors that they could consider, but
would not be bound to follow. Yet another possibility is to have the
judge give the jury his or her view of an appropriate award, but still
100. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
101. See, e.g., Terry J. Hatter, Jr., Drugs and the Law: "War Games, " 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 89, 90 (1995) ("[H]ow can one justify the so-called
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums that effectively take the
discretion from federal judges-those historically charged with the task of
balancing the protection of society with the proper punishment of the convicted
criminal?"); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) ("Whereas
sentencing once called for hours spent reflecting on the offense and the person,
we judges are becoming rubber-stamp bureaucrats. When we come to see
ourselves as judicial accountants, freed from the awful responsibility of
imposing a sentence, we will have abdicated our judicial role entirely."); Sheila
Balkan, Sentencing Matters, TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 74 (reviewing MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996)) ("Certainly one reason for the
disparity [still present in sentencing] is the power given to prosecutors to
influence the sentences of cooperative defendants so they receive more lenient
sentences than those under the guidelines. This is a power not given to
judges.").
102. This is one reason why the ABA/Brookings Symposium did not support
guidelines for damage awards. See ABA/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM, CHARTING
A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 16 (1992).
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permit the jury to make its own recommendation. The judge's award
could serve as an "anchor" for the jury's award. 10 3 Or, judges could
simply share with juries whatever information they now use to
decide whether they should adjust the jury's damage award. In each
instance, the goal would be for the court to give the jury some
additional information, which could be in the form of a range or a
ballpark figure, whereas now such information comes only from the
attorneys.
B. Special Verdicts/Interrogatories
Another alternative is for judges to use a special verdict or a
general verdict and interrogatories as a means of helping the jury to
structure its discussion of damages. These are procedural devices
that are already available to judges in civil cases in federal 10 4 and
state courts 1° 5 to assist the jury in structuring its discussion of the
case. When they are used, it is typically in the liability phase of a
trial; however, there is no reason they could not be used in the
damages phase.
Special verdicts and a general verdict and interrogatories are two
vehicles by which a judge can pose a series of questions to the jury to
help it in its reasoning process. For example, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court can give the jury a series of
written questions to which the jury is expected to respond by making
written findings of fact. 10 6 Alternatively, the court can give the jury
a set of written questions to which the jury is expected to make
written findings of fact as well as to render a general verdict.l°7 With
103. See Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert
Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 385, 386,
393 (1990) (finding that jurors use the plaintiff s ad damnum or dollar amount
of damages as an "anchor" from which they might go up or down in their
damages award depending on expert testimony).
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) & (b).
105. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-224(a) (West 1991); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 2-522(c) (2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4111 (b) & (c)
(McKinney 2004).
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (Special Verdicts).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to
Interrogatories).
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either method, the judge helps the jury to structure its consideration
of the issues.
The general reluctance on the part of judges to use either of
these devices is that the deliberations, and how the jury chooses to
structure them, are supposed to be the exclusive province of the
jurors. These procedural devices require the judge to play a
somewhat more intrusive role in the deliberations than is customary.
Judges are likely to feel that they are being intrusive whether the
special verdict or general verdict and interrogatories are directed to
helping the jury determine liability or damages. From the jury's
perspective, this approach, like the guidelines, shifts some power
from the jury to the judge.
C. Basic Tools
Perhaps at the most basic level, jurors could determine damages
more effectively if they had some basic tools, such as a laptop
computer with an Excel spreadsheet, or at the very least, a calculator.
Jurors are asked to determine damage awards, which in some cases
can be a complicated matter, and yet they are not given any tools,
other than perhaps pencil and paper, with which to do this. Giving
jurors basic tools, which they would have in any other work setting,
seems the least courts could do to enable juries to perform ably.
Providing jurors with basic tools is consistent with a growing
movement by some judges and academics to treat jurors as active
decision-makers rather than passive vessels into which information is
poured. 10 8 For example, in courts around the country, judges now
108. See, e.g., ABA/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 102, at 16 ("[W]e
generally support measures that would move the jury from being a 'passive'
fact-finder to taking a more 'active' part in the trial process. . . ."); B. Michael
Dann, From the Bench. Free the Jury, LITIG., Fall 1996, at 5 ("[T]he
traditional passive jury that absorbs evidence and law should be changed to an
active jury that participates as a near equal with judge and counsel."); Waking
Up Jurors, Shaking Up Courts, TRIAL, July 1997, at 20 ("The 'passive juror'
notion is an antiquated legal model that is neither educational nor democratic.
It flies in the face of what we know about human nature to assume that jurors
remain mentally passive, refrain from using preexisting frames of reference,
consider and remember all the evidence, and suspend all judgment until they
begin formal deliberations.") (quoting then-Arizona Superior Court Judge B.
Michael Dann).
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give jurors notepads and pens with which to take notes during the
trial. Fifteen years ago this practice was rare. 1°9 Ten years ago it
was widely recommended but still not widely practiced. 110 Only
within the past few years has it become fairly widespread.'11 Other
practices, such as allowing jurors to submit written questions to the
judge during the trial or allowing jurors to engage in pre-verdict
deliberations, are still viewed as cutting-edge and have only been put
into effect in a few states, such as Arizona."12  Yet all of these
innovations are consistent with a view that jurors should be treated as
active decision-makers, akin to judges. Equipping jurors with such
basic tools as laptops and calculators 113 is consistent with this active
model of the juror as well as with expectations that jurors have from
their experiences in the workplace or classroom. 114
VI. WHAT Is AT STAKE?
A. The Jury as Scapegoat
The civil jury is an easy target. Jurors are ordinary citizens who
are summoned to serve on a jury and who complete their service and
return to their private lives. They are not repeat players in the
109. See SAUL M. KASSrN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN
JURY ON TRIAL 128-29 (1988) (relying on an Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts estimate that "90 percent of the federal judges do not permit jurors
to take notes" and asking: "So why is there so much resistance?").
110. See ABA/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 102, at 18-19
(describing juror note-taking as "the most widely suggested reform for
enhancing juror comprehension" and noting that it was "far from universal,"
but recommending that "it become so").
11. JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 141 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds.,
1997).
112. See, e.g., William H. Carlile, Arizona Jury Reforms Buck Legal
Traditions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1 (reporting that
Arizona adopted eighteen of the jury reform panel's fifty-five
recommendations, including allowing jurors to submit written questions to the
judge and to engage in pre-verdict deliberations in civil trials).
113. For other tools that jurors should be given, see Nancy S. Marder, Juries
and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK.
L. REV. 1257 (2001).
114. See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, For the New College B.M.O.C., 'M' Is For
'Machine,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at G7 ("The computer has... become
the portal through which students do everything they need to do on campus.").
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judicial process. Even more important, they are not professionals
and typically have no training in the law.
There is ambivalence toward juries. Perhaps this is attributable
to the fact that they are made up of laypersons. Juries are entrusted
with enormous responsibilities-deciding liability and damages in
civil cases and life or death in some criminal cases-yet jurors are
often treated as if they cannot be trusted. Until recently, they were
not allowed to take notes during the trial, no matter how lengthy and
complex it was, for fear the note-taking would distract them. 1 5 In
most courtrooms, they are not allowed to submit written questions,
no matter how reasonable or pertinent they are, for fear that it will
lead them to form a view of the case too early in the process. 116 In
all courtrooms, they are not instructed on the jury's power to nullify
for fear that the jury will engage in nullification too readily and
without just cause.1 17  At the same time that jurors are asked to
decide the hardest cases in our society, the ones for which there are
no right answers, they are rarely given all the tools they need to
perform that function.
It is not surprising, then, that juries have become the scapegoat
in this debate on escalating medical malpractice premiums. Whereas
doctors and insurers are professionals who have powerful lobbying
arms with ample resources, jurors are laypersons who have nobody
to speak on their behalf and who are paid from $5 to $40 per day for
their services. It seems much easier to blame juries and to limit their
scope than it does to revamp health coverage and the insurance
industry's role in it.
B. The Dangers of the Popular Account
Casting the civil jury into the role of scapegoat in this debate is
not without costs. The U.S. Supreme Court has described the
115. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 109, at 128.
116. See Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask
or Not To Ask, That Is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1099, 1108-09
(2003).
117. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1139-44 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining why
juries should be educated as to their power to nullify and attributing courts'
failure to do so to an underlying distrust of juries).
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criminal jury as a buffer between the defendant and an overzealous
prosecutor or hardened judge.' 1 8 In medical malpractice cases, the
civil jury serves as a buffer between the injured plaintiff and the
medical professional charged with having acted negligently. The
injured plaintiff has no other body to turn to for redress. State review
boards, staffed by fellow doctors unwilling to second-guess a
colleague, rarely provide a viable means of redress. Even injured
individuals who prefer to avoid the emotional toll of litigation, and
who only wish to see that the doctor is stopped from engaging in
negligent treatment of other patients in the future, have few routes to
achieve that modest goal.
The civil jury serves as a buffer between the injured plaintiff and
individuals and corporations who have acted negligently,
irresponsibly, or even unscrupulously and caused them serious harm.
The civil jury, comprised of ordinary citizens who hear only one case
and who have no stake in the outcome of that case, often can take a
stand that is more courageous or innovative than a legislature can.
Earlier in our history, when civil juries declined to find
contributory negligence, they essentially created a regime of
comparative negligence before the legislature and judges had
eliminated contributory negligence as a defense. 1'9 In other areas as
well, from the law of wrongful discharge, in which jury verdicts
slowly created a form of job security that the common-law doctrine
of employment-at-will denied, to the award of punitive damages,
juries have helped to shape the law and have sometimes taken the
lead until legislatures have been ready to act. 1
20
VII. CONCLUSION
The chipping away of the civil jury, as proponents of the popular
account advocate, will have ramifications far beyond cases of
medical malpractice. The civil jury stands as a bulwark against
118. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing an accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.").
119. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 113.
120. See id.
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wrongful behavior that causes injury. The damage award not only
tries to make the injured plaintiff whole again, but also encourages
the defendant, whether it is a doctor, hospital, or car manufacturer, to
take steps to reduce the possibility of harm to others in the future. If
the civil jury is pared down so that it becomes a "jury lite" and can
no longer hear certain kinds of cases or award certain kinds of
damages, then the citizenry will lose the protections that the jury
system has traditionally afforded. Far better, at least in my view, is
to keep the civil jury strong and to give it the tools it needs to
perform its vital roles.
